Russia selling cruise missiles to Syria, but U.S. silent
Russia selling cruise missiles to Syria, but U.S. silent
- September 26th, 2010 7:21 am ET
American Jewish Committee leaders expressed their objections to the Syrian arms deal in a meeting with the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, in New York this week.
“Russia’s decision to sell these missiles to Syria is dangerously counterproductive to advancing Arab-Israeli peace,” said AJC Executive Director David Harris.
“Both Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have made their objections to this deal clear, on the grounds that it will seriously jeopardize an already dangerous situation in the region. All countries truly concerned about Middle East peace should tell Russia explicitly that this arms deal is unacceptable,” said Harris.
The deal was announced by Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, who noted that both the United States and Israel had objected to the sale.
Syria is a major supporter of the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah, which has used Russian-made weapons in the past, most recently in its 2006 war against Israel. Under the terms of the current deal, P-800 Yakhont cruise missiles, which have a range of 200 miles and carry a 440 pound warhead, would be delivered to the Damascus regime.
The Russians continue to supply a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, India, and China. Iran’s earlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russia helped to accelerate its development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, and continuing Russian entity assistance has supported Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran’s self-sufficiency in missile production.
The Russians also remain a key source of dual-use biotechnology equipment, chemicals and related expertise for countries of concern with active chemical and biological weapons programs. Russia’s well-known biological and chemical expertise made it an attractive target for countries seeking assistance in areas with CBW (Chemical-Biological Weapons) applications.
For instance, Russia and Syria have continued their long-standing agreements on cooperation regarding nuclear energy, although specific assistance has not yet materialized. Broader access to foreign expertise provides opportunities to expand its indigenous capabilities and the CIA is looking at Syrian nuclear intentions with growing concern.
Damascus continued to seek help from abroad to establish a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability. Syria’s liquid-propellant missile program continued to depend on essential foreign equipment and assistance — primarily from North Korean entities. Damascus also continued to manufacture liquid-propellant Scud missiles. In addition, Syria is developing longer-range missile programs such as a Scud D and possibly other variants with assistance from North Korea and Iran.
Syria also continues to seek chemical weapons-related expertise from foreign sources and Damascus already possesses a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin, but apparently tried to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. It is highly probable that Syria also continued to develop an offensive BW capability.
Syria reportedly continues to acquire limited quantities of CW, mainly from Russia. However, Damascus’s Soviet-era debt to Moscow and inability to fund large purchases continues to hamper efforts to purchase the large quantity of equipment Syria requires to replace its aging weapons inventory.
Russia continues to be a major supplier of conventional arms, as well. Following Moscow’s abrogation of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement in November 2000, Russian officials stated that they saw Iran as a significant source of potential revenue from arms sales and believed that Tehran could become Russia’s third-largest conventional arms customer after China and India.
Russia was and is the primary source for China, Iran, Libya, and Sudan, and one of the largest sources for India. For example, Russia actively marketed its thermobaric weapons at international arms shows, which likely increases the availability of this type of weapon in the open market. Meanwhile, Russia continues to be the main supplier of technology and equipment to India’s and China’s naval nuclear propulsion programs.
